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Background. The World Health Organization (WHO) coordinates the Global Invasive Bacterial Vaccine-Preventable Diseases 
(IB-VPD) Surveillance Network to support vaccine introduction decisions and use. The network was established to strengthen surveil-
lance and laboratory confirmation of meningitis caused by Streptococcus pneumoniae, Haemophilus influenzae, and Neisseria meningitidis.
Methods. Sentinel hospitals report cases of children <5 years of age hospitalized for suspected meningitis. Laboratories report 
confirmatory testing results and strain characterization tested by polymerase chain reaction. In 2019, the network included 123 la-
boratories that follow validated, standardized testing and reporting strategies.
Results. From 2014 through 2019, >137 000 suspected meningitis cases were reported by 58 participating countries, with 44.6% 
(n = 61 386) reported from countries in the WHO African Region. More than half (56.6%, n = 77 873) were among children <1 year 
of age, and 4.0% (n = 4010) died among those with reported disease outcome. Among suspected meningitis cases, 8.6% (n = 11 798) 
were classified as probable bacterial meningitis. One of 3 bacterial pathogens was identified in 30.3% (n = 3576) of these cases, 
namely S. pneumoniae (n = 2177 [60.9%]), H. influenzae (n = 633 [17.7%]), and N. meningitidis (n = 766 [21.4%]). Among con-
firmed bacterial meningitis cases with outcome reported, 11.0% died; case fatality ratio varied by pathogen (S. pneumoniae, 12.2%; 
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H. influenzae, 6.1%; N. meningitidis, 11.0%). Among the 277 children who died with confirmed bacterial meningitis, 189 (68.2%) had 
confirmed S. pneumoniae. The proportion of pneumococcal cases with pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV) serotypes decreased 
as the number of countries implementing PCV increased, from 77.8% (n = 273) to 47.5% (n = 248). Of 397 H. influenzae specimens 
serotyped, 49.1% (n = 195) were type b. Predominant N. meningitidis serogroups varied by region.
Conclusions. This multitier, global surveillance network has supported countries in detecting and serotyping the 3 principal 
invasive bacterial pathogens that cause pediatric meningitis. Streptococcus pneumoniae was the most common bacterial pathogen 
detected globally despite the growing number of countries that have nationally introduced PCV. The large proportions of deaths due 
to S. pneumoniae reflect the high proportion of meningitis cases caused by this pathogen. This global network demonstrated a strong 
correlation between PCV introduction status and reduction in the proportion of pneumococcal meningitis infections caused by vac-
cine serotypes. Maintaining case-based, active surveillance with laboratory confirmation for prioritized vaccine-preventable diseases 
remains a critical component of the global agenda in public health.
Keywords.  invasive bacterial disease; surveillance; vaccine preventable disease, meningitis; pneumococcal, meningococcal; 
pneumococcal conjugate vaccine.
Streptococcus pneumoniae (Sp), Haemophilus influenzae (Hi), 
and Neisseria meningitidis (Nm) are the major causes of bacterial 
meningitis in children <5 years of age worldwide, particularly 
in countries with limited resources [1]. Extensive use of Hi type 
b (Hib) and pneumococcal conjugate vaccines (PCVs) have re-
sulted in marked decline in the global disease burden of Hib and 
pneumococcal diseases [2]. The introduction of MenAfriVac, 
a meningococcal group A  conjugate vaccine rolled out in the 
African meningitis belt countries, has also led to a decline in the 
incidence of suspected meningitis and epidemic risk [3].
The World Health Organization (WHO) has overseen and coor-
dinated the Global Invasive Bacterial Vaccine-Preventable Disease 
(IB-VPD) Surveillance Network (GISN) since 2009. The network 
was established to standardize the monitoring of the global burden 
and etiology of IB-VPD and to support PCV introduction and 
monitor its impact, primarily in low- and middle-income coun-
tries (LMICs) with limited surveillance and laboratory capacity [4, 
5]. The laboratory network of GISN was developed as a multitier 
structure of global, regional, and national laboratories to provide 
technical assistance and guidance to support country-level surveil-
lance activities in meningitis and other invasive bacterial diseases. 
The network followed operational modalities similar to other 
WHO-coordinated laboratory networks for vaccine-preventable 
diseases with tiered-approach technical support from global and 
regional laboratories to national and sentinel site laboratories [6].
Surveillance of vaccine-preventable diseases can provide critical 
information for policymakers; data on Sp, Hi, and Nm in LMICs 
are limited [7]. Robust surveillance data also aid the early detection 
and management of meningococcal or pneumococcal outbreaks 
[8]. The aim of this report is to describe the etiology, serotype and 
serogroup, epidemiology, and clinical presentations of pediatric 
bacterial meningitis in LMICs contributing to this global network.
METHODS
Case Definitions, Enrollment, and Data Collection
Between 2014 and 2019, active, case-based meningitis sur-
veillance was conducted by 149 participating sentinel hospital 
surveillance sites in 58 WHO Member States from all 6 WHO 
regions: the African Region, Region of the Americas, Eastern 
Mediterranean Region, European Region, South-East Asia 
Region, and Western Pacific Region.
Sentinel site hospitals conducting meningitis surveillance 
through GISN are asked to report all suspected meningitis 
infections in hospitalized children aged <5 years to WHO on 
a monthly basis. WHO headquarters receive the compiled 
surveillance data quarterly from each WHO regional office. 
Suspected meningitis is defined as illness in a child aged 
0–59 months admitted to a hospital with sudden-onset fever 
(>38.5°C rectal or 38°C axillary) and 1 of the following signs: 
neck stiffness, altered consciousness with no other alterna-
tive diagnosis, or other meningeal signs; or illness in any pa-
tient aged 0–59  months who is hospitalized with a clinical 
diagnosis of meningitis [9]. The sentinel site hospitals are 
asked to collect cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) from all children 
with suspected meningitis. Results of laboratory diagnos-
tics are then used to further classify suspected meningitis 
cases. Standardized case definitions for suspected, probable, 
and confirmed bacterial meningitis (Table 1) are used by all 
participating hospitals [9].
Laboratory Methods
The initial laboratory analysis of CSF specimens collected from 
suspected meningitis cases include microscopy, culture, and 
rapid diagnostic tests (BinaxNOW for Sp detection and Pastorex 
Meningitis antigen rapid latex agglutination for Sp, Nm, and Hi) 
[10]. Cell count, glucose, and protein concentration from CSF 
samples are used to determine whether the cases are probable 
bacterial meningitis cases (Table 1). All sentinel site laboratories 
(SSLs) performed culture and could perform rapid diagnostic tests 
(RDTs); however, occasional disruptions to the supply chain for 
reagents occurred, and not all samples were tested by all methods.
Clinical specimens from suspected meningitis cases with 
sufficient residual material are referred to regional reference la-
boratories (RRLs) for molecular testing to identify Sp, Hi, or 
Nm and serotyping/serogrouping. In addition, all bacterial iso-
lates are referred to RRLs for confirmation and molecular char-
acterization. The PCR methods performed at all 9 RRLs were 
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mainly adapted from the Global Reference Laboratory (GRL) 
based at the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(Atlanta, Georgia), including conventional and real-time PCR 
assays for the target lytA (Sp), hpd (Hi), and SodC or ctrA (Nm) 
genes for identification of the pathogens and multiplex PCR as-
says for serotyping/serogrouping [11–15]. In most laboratories, 
Sp, Hi, and Nm serotype/serogroup data reported were deter-
mined using PCR on CSF samples. All RRLs were testing the 
referred samples by PCR for detection of the 3 pathogens from 
CSF samples and for the serotyping/serogrouping of positive 
Sp, Hi, and Nm cases from CSF or bacterial isolates received. 
A limited number of RRLs in the network used the Quellung 
reaction on Sp isolates for determining the serotype.
As of 2019, the laboratory network of GISN included 88 sen-
tinel site laboratories, 26 national laboratories (NLs), 8 RRLs, 
and 1 GRL (Figure 1). All participating laboratories in GISN 
follow validated, standardized testing and reporting strategies 
and undertake annual quality assurance and quality control ex-
ercises that are coordinated by WHO and technical partners. 
WHO recommends the freezing and storage of CSF from –20°C 
or –70°C at the SSLs or hospitals prior to sending to RRLs. 
When further characterization is necessary, RRLs can refer the 
specimens to the GRL.
Quality Assurance
WHO has implemented global quality assurance programs that 
help assess the performance of laboratories. An annual external 
quality assessment (EQA) exercise is conducted in collaboration 
with the United Kingdom National External Quality Assessment 
Unit at Public Health England and consists of sending blinded 
proficiency testing panels of bacterial meningitis to the network 
laboratories. SSLs and NLs receive proficiency testing panels of 
Table 1. Meningitis Case Definitions
Suspected meningitis Illness in a child aged 0–59 mo admitted to hospital with sudden-onset fever (>38.5°C rectal or 38°C axillary) and 1 of the following 
signs: neck stiffness, altered consciousness with no other alternative diagnosis, or other meningeal signs; or illness in any patient 
aged 0–59 mo who is hospitalized with a clinical diagnosis of meningitis.
Probable bacterial 
meningitis
A suspected meningitis case with CSF examination showing at least 1 of the following: turbid appearance; leukocytosis (>100 
cells/μL); leukocytosis (10–100 cells/μL) AND either an elevated protein (>100 mg/dL) or decreased glucose (<40 mg/dL). If pro-
tein and glucose results are not available, diagnose using the first 2 conditions (turbid appearance or leukocytosis >100 cells/μL).
Confirmed bacterial 
meningitis
A suspected meningitis case or probable meningitis case that is laboratory-confirmed by growing (ie, culturing) or identification 
(ie, by Gram stain, antigen detection by immunochromatography or latex agglutination, polymerase chain reaction) of a bacterial 
pathogen (Hib, pneumococcus, or meningococcus) in the CSF or from the blood in a child with a clinical syndrome consistent with 
bacterial meningitis.
Abbreviations: CSF, cerebrospinal fluid; Hib, Haemophilus influenzae type b.
Global reference lab (n = 1)
Regional reference lab (n = 8)
National/Sub-national (n = 26)
Site lab (n = 88)*






Only one sentinel site laboratory plotted by country. Position of  labs on the map does not always reflect their exact geographical location  
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used on this map do notimply the expression of  any opinion whatsever on the part of  the
World Health Organization concerning the legal status of  any country, territory, city or area or of  its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of  its
frontiers or boundaries. Dotted and dashed lines on maps represent approximate border lines for which there may not yet be full agreement.
World Health Organization, WHO, 2020. All rights reserved
Global IB-VPD Surveillance Network
0 875 1750 3500 Kilometer
Figure 1. World Health Organization (WHO) Member States and network laboratories that reported surveillance and laboratory data to the WHO Global Invasive Bacterial 
Vaccine-Preventable Disease (IB-VPD) Surveillance Network, 2019.
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bacterial cultures and Gram stain slides while RRLs and those 
SSLs and NLs having molecular testing capacities additionally 
receive CSF-simulated samples for molecular diagnosis and 
serotyping/serogrouping. A detailed report of the EQA results 
was shared annually with individual laboratories and helped 
identify areas for further technical support from RRLs or WHO.
Other measures of quality control were implemented at the 
regional level, such as a referral of randomly selected specimens 
and isolates collected from the sentinel or hospital laboratories 
to the corresponding RRLs for confirmatory testing, though 
this was not consistent in all regions and depended on avail-
able capacities and resources. At the global level, a standard ex-
ternal quality control exercise is conducted annually between 
the RRLs and GRL and consists of referring 50 previously char-
acterized and select specimens (including a sampling of some 
that tested negative and positive) and isolates, from each RRL 
to the GRL for confirmatory testing. Discordant results are in-
vestigated and addressed to identify and remediate any issues or 
concerns that may impact the consensus of results. The results 
are also used to highlight areas of strength in capacity as well as 
to understand where additional training and resources should 
be focused for improvement.
Data Analysis
This report analyzes cases reported from 2014 to 2019; prior to 
2014, most of the WHO regions collected aggregate data rather 
than case-based data. Data management and statistical analysis 
were performed using Stata (version 16) and R (version  4.0.2) 
softwares. Statistical tests included the Pearson χ 2 test and the 
χ 2 test for trend to compare proportions of serotypes and sero-
groups over time and to assess the level of association between 
vaccine introduction status and whether the serotype/sero-
group was a vaccine type or not.
For the analysis of Sp serotype distribution, vaccine types 
and nonvaccine types were categorized based on the type of 
PCV that was used as part of the country’s routine immuniza-
tion program during a specific year. The 7-valent PCV (PCV7) 
includes serotypes 4, 6B, 9V, 14, 18C, 19F, and 23F; 10-valent 
PCV (PCV10) includes serotypes 1, 5, and 7F in addition to 
those covered in PCV7; 13-valent PVC (PCV13) includes 3, 6A, 
and 19A in addition to those covered in PCV13. If countries 
switched the PCV type used between 2014 and 2019, this was 
taken into account in the analysis. Although only serotypes 6A 
and 6B are covered by PCV13, serotypes 6C and 6D were com-
bined together when analyzing the Sp serotype distribution due 
to the fact that while some laboratories use PCR (ie, can distin-
guish between 6A/6B and 6C/6D), some use Quellung as their 
routine procedure in serotyping (ie, can distinguish between all 
4 serotypes). Pre–PCV introduction years included years before 
the country introduced PCV in its routine immunization pro-
gram as well as the first year when PCV was introduced (taking 
into account the possible low vaccination coverage during the 
first year). Post–PCV introduction years included from the 
second year onward after PCV was routinely introduced.
Ethical Considerations
Approval was granted by the ministries of health of the 
participating countries to report epidemiological and labora-
tory data to WHO as part of ongoing routine surveillance of 
vaccine-preventable diseases. This work was part of routine 
surveillance and did not require human subjects review.
RESULTS
Description of Suspected, Probable, and Confirmed Bacterial 
Meningitis Cases
From 2014 through 2019, 137 609 suspected meningitis cases 
from 58 countries were reported to GISN (Table 2). The number 
of sentinel sites that reported linked clinical and laboratory data 
varied by year: 110 sites in 54 countries (2014), 123 sites in 55 
countries (2015), 126 sites in 58 countries (2016), 118 sites in 54 
countries (2017), 123 sites in 51 countries (2018), and 105 sites 
in 45 countries (2019) reported data. Throughout the 6-year 
period of surveillance, most (n = 41 [70.7%]) countries re-
ported during all years, whereas 17 countries reported between 
2 and 5 years. Among the total of 149 sentinel sites that ever 
reported surveillance data during the 6-year period, 86 sentinel 
sites (57.7%) reported at least once each year for all 6 consec-
utive years. Also, 127 (85.2%) of the 149 total sentinel sites re-
ported at least 10 months of surveillance data at any given year 
during the time period 2014–2019.
The largest contributor of suspected meningitis cases was in 
the 29 participating countries in the African Region (n = 61 386 
[44.6%] of all suspected cases), followed by cases reported by 
the 3 countries in South-East Asia (n = 34 167 [24.8%]), the 4 
countries in the Eastern Mediterranean (n = 18 714 [13.6%]), 
and 6 countries in the Western Pacific (n = 14  365 [10.4%]). 
The mean age of suspected meningitis cases was 14  months; 
56.6% (n = 77 873) were reported among children aged <1 year. 
A slight majority (n = 81 330 [59.2%]) of cases were in males. 
Information on disease outcome was available for 100  217 
children with suspected meningitis. Of these, 4010 (4.0%) 
died and 1884 (1.9%) were discharged but with sequelae (not 
specified).
CSF specimens were collected from 119  808 (76.6%) sus-
pected meningitis cases; 105  418 (88.0% of CSF specimens 
collected) were tested for presence of bacteria tested by cul-
ture and/or RDTs at the hospital laboratory before referral to 
the RRLs for PCR. The network used culture, RDT, and PCR 
for determining the positivity rates (microscopy not included). 
Specimens collected from all children with suspected menin-
gitis included CSF and in some cases peripheral blood. CSF 
specimens were collected from 73.5% (n = 2628/3576) of the 
confirmed bacterial meningitis cases, blood specimens were 
collected from 2.0% (n = 71/3576), and both CSF and blood 
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specimens were collected from 24.5% (n = 876/3576). (One case 
out of 3576 had a misreporting of having neither CSF or blood, 
but it was included as it was reported as a confirmed menin-
gitis case that tested positive for Sp with a reported serotype.) 
The proportion of CSF specimens collected that were labora-
tory tested ranged by region, from 89.1% (n = 15 247/17 114) 
in the Eastern Mediterranean Region to 99.7% (n = 2344/2352) 
in the European Region (Figure 2). Among suspected cases, 
8.6% (n = 11  798) were classified as probable bacterial men-
ingitis. The proportions of suspected meningitis cases also 
reported as probable meningitis cases were largest for cases 
from the 6 countries in the European Region (40.1% of sus-
pected meningitis cases, n = 948/2363) and from the 10 coun-
tries in the Americas (17.4%, n = 1148/6614), compared to 
4.4% (n = 815/18  714) and 5.2% (n = 1768/34  167) of cases 
from the Eastern Mediterranean and South-East Asia regions, 
respectively.
Overall, a bacterial pathogen was identified in 3576 cases, 
confirming bacterial meningitis for 2.6% of suspected menin-
gitis cases. Among these confirmed cases, 2130 cases (59.6%) 
met the probable meningitis case definition; the remaining 
confirmed cases that did not meet the probable meningitis 
case definition had a bacterial etiology detected by PCR or cul-
ture. The proportions of probable meningitis cases that were 
confirmed varied by WHO region, from 21.8% (Americas, 
n = 250) to 39.7% (European, n = 376). The predominant bac-
teria detected was Sp, which was identified in 2177 (60.9%) of 
the confirmed cases, followed by Nm, which was identified in 
766 (21.4%) cases and Hi, identified in 633 (17.7%) cases (Table 
2). The proportion of confirmed bacterial meningitis cases with 
each pathogen identified varied by WHO region. Whereas in 
the African Region, 57.0% of confirmed bacterial meningitis 
cases were due to Sp (n = 1045/1833), approximately one-
third of confirmed bacterial meningitis cases in the European 
Region were due to Sp (n = 112 [29.8%]). In contrast, Sp com-
prised >75% of confirmed bacterial meningitis cases for 3 re-
gions—Eastern Mediterranean (n = 197 [86.0%]), South-East 
Asia (n = 314 [81.6%]), and Western Pacific (n = 382 [75.9%]). 
The proportion of confirmed cases due to Hi ranged from 4.1% 
(n = 16/385) of cases in South-East Asia to 30.0% (n = 75/250) 
of confirmed bacterial meningitis cases reported by countries 
in the Americas. A  greater range was reported for Nm, from 
3.1% (n = 7/229) of confirmed cases due to Nm in the Eastern 
Mediterranean Region to 51.3% (n = 193/376) of cases due to 
Nm in the European Region.
Among all children aged <5  years with probable bacterial 
meningitis, 7.9% (n = 675) died and 4.0% (n = 337) were dis-
charged alive but with sequelae. Among children with con-
firmed bacterial meningitis, 11.0% (n = 277) died and 5.1% 
(n = 130) were discharged from the hospital with sequelae 
(Table 2). Among the 277 children who died with confirmed 
bacterial meningitis, 189 (68.2%) had confirmed Sp. Compared 
with the case fatality ratio among children with Hi meningitis 
(24/395 [6.1%]), the case fatality ratio was greater among those 
infected by Sp (189/1547 [12.2%]; P < .001) and Nm (64/583 
[11.0%]; P < .01).
Pneumococcal Meningitis and Serotype Distribution
Pneumococcal serotype was determined for 873 of 2177 
(40.1%) pneumococcal cases detected from the 6 WHO regions 
during 2014–2019 (Figure 3A). The distribution of serotypes 
for years in which countries that had not yet introduced PCV 
into their routine immunization programs was different from 
the serotype distribution for years after countries introduced 
PCV (Figure 3B; Pearson χ 2 = 143.10, P < .001). The most 
common PCV serotypes (and the percentage of vaccine-type 
serotypes reported) during post–PCV vaccination introduction 
years were the following: serotypes 6A/B/C/D (9.4%), serotype 
1 (6.3%), and serotype 5 (6.3%). During post–PCV vaccine in-
troduction years, 52.9% (n = 274) of the serotypes were non-
PCV13 compared to 22.2% (n = 78) during pre–PCV vaccine 
introduction. There was a strong association between vaccine 
introduction status and whether the serotype was a vaccine type 
or not (Pearson χ 2 = 79.91; P < .001).
Among the countries that introduced PCV during or prior 
to 2019 and also reported pneumococcal serotype results, the 
proportion of infections caused by vaccine serotypes (serotypes 
in PCV10 or PCV13, depending on the vaccine in use in each 
country) declined over the 6-year period, from 49.0% in 2014 to 
27.8% in 2019 (Figure 4); there was a significant decline in the 
proportion of infections caused by vaccine serotypes over time 
(χ 2 test for trend, P = .01).
H. influenzae Meningitis and Serotype Distribution
All countries participating in GISN had introduced the Hib con-
jugate vaccine into their national immunization schedule prior 
to 2019. Among the 633 Hi detected from the participating 
countries in 2014–2019, 236 (37.3%) were serotyped; 82.6% 
(n = 195) were determined to be Hib. When comparing vaccine-
type Hi (Hib) to nonvaccine type Hi (either serotypes a, b, e, f or 
categorized as non-Hib if the laboratory only serotypes for type 
b), Hib was detected by the majority across all WHO regions 
with a range of 57.9% (n = 11/19) in 2018 to 92.5% (n = 49/53) 
in 2016.
Meningococcal Meningitis and Serogroup Distribution
Serogroup results were reported for 391 of the 766 (51.0%) 
confirmed bacterial meningitis cases in which Nm was 
identified. The most common serogroup was serogroup B, 
accounting for nearly half (n = 193 [49.4%]) of the speci-
mens with a reported serogroup (Supplementary Figure 1). 
When comparing the proportion of Nm cases caused by sero-
group B to the proportion caused by other serogroups (A, 
C, Y/W, and X), a significantly greater proportion of cases 
were due to serogroup B over time (χ 2 test for trend, P < .001; 
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Table 2. Clinical, Laboratory, and Epidemiological Characteristics of Suspected, Probable, and Confirmed Meningitis Cases Detected and Reported to the 
World Health Organization Global Invasive Bacterial Vaccine-Preventable Disease Surveillance Network, 2014–2019
Characteristic
Suspected Meningitis 







Confirmed Sp Cases 
(n = 2177)
Confirmed Hi Cases 
(n = 633)









































Age group, mo            
 0–5 52 452 (38.1) 5801 (11.1) 1334 (23.0) 864 (64.8) 252 (18.9) 218 (16.3)
 6–11 25 421 (18.5) 1894 (7.5) 886 (46.8) 584 (65.9) 165 (18.6) 137 (15.5)
 12–23 25 617 (18.6) 1459 (5.7) 502 (34.4) 277 (55.2) 88 (17.5) 137 (27.3)
 24–59 34 119 (24.8) 2644 (7.7) 854 (32.3) 452 (52.9) 128 (15.0) 274 (32.1)
 Mean age, mo 14 13 14 13 12 20
 Cases with age 
reported
137 609  … 11 798 (8.6) 3576 (30.3) 2177 (60.9) 633 (17.7) 766 (21.4)
Sex             
 Male 81 330 (59.2) 6916 (8.5) 2084 (30.1) 1282 (61.5) 359 (17.2) 443 (21.3)
 Cases with sex 
reported
137 304  … 11 766 (8.6) 3565 (30.3) 2171 (60.9) 630 (17.7) 764 (21.4)
Laboratory testing of CSF            
 WBC count >100 
cells/μL
5183 (6.9) 5183 (100.0) 1312 (25.3) 740 (56.4) 214 (16.3) 358 (27.3)
 Cases with WBC 
counts analyzed
74 924  … 10 194 (13.6) 2660 (26.1) 1511 (56.8) 512 (19.2) 661 (24.8)
 Protein >100 
mg/dL
9441 (18.3) 4279 (45.3) 1069 (25.0) 693 (64.8) 139 (13.0) 237 (22.2)
 Cases with protein 
analyzed
51 473  … 8100 (15.7) 1881 (23.2) 1115 (59.3) 303 (16.1) 463 (24.6)
 Glucose <40 
mg/dL
13 819 (24.6) 4155 (49.1) 1044 (55.7) 622 (56.8) 175 (58.1) 247 (51.6)
 Cases with glu-
cose analyzed
56 273  … 8468 (15.0) 1876 (22.2) 1096 (58.4) 301 (16.0) 479 (25.5)
CSF appearancec             
 Clear 66 958 (76.6) 2634 (3.9) 1044 (39.6) 561 (53.7) 240 (23.0) 243 (23.3)
 Turbid/cloudy 7258 (8.3) 7258 (100.0) 1691 (23.3) 1045 (61.8) 264 (15.6) 382 (22.6)
 Cases with CSF 
appearance  
analyzed
87 431  … 11 470 (13.1) 3078 (26.8) 1830 (59.5) 557 (18.1) 691 (22.4)
Outcome             
 Died 4010 (4.0) 675 (16.8) 277 (41.0) 189 (68.2) 24 (8.7) 64 (23.1)
 Discharged alive 
with sequelae




86 468 (86.3) 6739 (7.8) 1882 (27.9) 1127 (59.9) 309 (16.4) 446 (23.7)
 Cases with out-
come reported
100 217  … 8493 (8.5) 2525 (29.7) 1547 (61.3) 395 (15.6) 583 (23.1)
WHO Region             
 African 61 386 (44.6) 5603 (9.1) 1833 (32.7) 1045 (57.0) 386 (21.1) 402 (21.9)
 Americas 6614 (4.8) 1148 (17.4) 250 (21.8) 127 (50.8) 75 (30.0) 48 (19.2)
 Eastern Mediter-
ranean 
18 714 (13.6) 815 (4.4) 229 (28.1) 197 (86.0) 25 (10.9) 7 (3.1)
 European 2363 (1.7) 948 (40.1) 376 (39.7) 112 (29.8) 71 (18.9) 193 (51.3)
 South-East Asia 34 167 (24.8) 1768 (5.2) 385 (21.8) 314 (81.6) 16 (4.2) 55 (14.3)
 Western Pacific 14,365 (10.4) 1516 (10.6) 503 (33.2) 382 (75.9) 60 (11.9) 61 (12.1)
 Total cases with 
region  
reported
137 609  … 11 798 (8.6) 3576 (30.3) 2177 (60.9) 633 (17.7) 766 (21.4)
Abbreviations: CSF, cerebrospinal fluid; Hi, Haemophilus influenzae; Nm, Neisseria meningitidis; Sp, Streptococcus pneumoniae; WBC, white blood cell; WHO, World Health Organization.
aThe total of confirmed bacterial meningitis cases (n = 3576) is a subset of the probable bacterial meningitis cases. A total of 2130 confirmed cases met the probable bacterial meningitis 
cases definition, whereas 1446 confirmed cases did not meet the probable bacterial meningitis case definition but later had an etiology detected.
bThe denominator for the indicated percentages was taken from the total cases reported/analyzed in each category as indicated in the column of number of suspected meningitis cases. 
(eg, 38.1% of cases were reported in the age group 0–5 months [52 452/137 609]).
cIndicators that contribute to classification of “probable bacterial meningitis.”
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Supplementary Figure 2). Serogroup Y/W was the second 
most common, detected in 33.8% (n = 132), and serogroup 
C was detected in 15.1% (n = 59) of cases. The predominant 
serogroup detected varied by region. Serogroups Y/W were 
most common serogroups (87.6% of serogroups reported, 
n = 106) in the African Region whereas serogroup B was most 
common in the European Region (58.6%, n = 89), the South-
East Asia Region (100%, n = 54) and Western Pacific Region 
(91.2%, n = 31) (Supplementary Figure 1). In the African 
Region, where epidemics of serogroup A were common prior 
to implementation of meningococcal serogroup A conjugate 
vaccine (MACV) vaccine, only 1 of 121 Nm cases (0.8%) that 
were serogrouped were type A.
Results of External Quality Assessment
Up to 9 RRLs and 112 SSLs and NLs participated in the EQA exer-
cise each year from 2014 to 2019. Based on a passing score of 75% 
for SSLs and NLs and 90% for RRLs, the proportion of labora-
tories that passed ranged from 83% to 92% during 2014–2019. 
Through capacity building and laboratory workshops coordinated 
by WHO, several participating NLs acquired PCR capacity from 
2015 to 2019 as indicated by their reporting of results in sero-
typing/serogrouping using PCR on simulated CSF samples on 
the EQA exercise; in 2015, 8 of 16 laboratories (50.0%) passed the 
EQA whereas in 2019, 15 of 22 laboratories passed (68.2%).
DISCUSSION
The WHO-coordinated Global IB-VPD Surveillance Network 
captured case-based, laboratory-confirmed pediatric menin-
gitis surveillance data from 58 countries representing all 6 
WHO regions, providing a global landscape of this severe 
childhood infection. Pneumococcus was the most common 
pathogen detected from pediatric bacterial meningitis cases 
Cases with specimens collected Cases with specimens testedCases identified



































Figure 2. Number of children <5 years old with suspected meningitis who were reported and for whom specimens were collected and laboratory testing completed as 
part of the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Invasive Bacterial Vaccine-Preventable Disease Surveillance Network, by WHO region, 2014–2019. Across all regions 
from 2014 to 2019, 137 609 cases were identified from 58 countries, 119 808 specimens (87% of enrolled cases) were collected, and 105 418 specimens (88% of collected 
specimens) were tested by culture, polymerase chain reaction, and/or rapid diagnostic tests.
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in GISN, despite increasing use of highly effective PCVs. 
The data also showed that among the children who died with 
confirmed bacterial meningitis, the majority had confirmed 
Sp infections. This highlights the importance of continuing 
meningitis surveillance with linked clinical and laboratory 
data. Not only will such surveillance be critical in detecting 
the number of pediatric meningitis cases, but it will also 
identify the type of pathogen as pneumococcus continues to 
be a fatal disease among children worldwide.
The continued occurrence of both vaccine-type and 
nonvaccine-type Sp meningitis cases suggests a role for both 
increased PCV coverage and higher-valent PCVs. There were 
regional differences in the bacterial etiologies and serotypes or 
serogroups most commonly causing meningitis. All countries 
in the surveillance network had introduced the Hib vaccine, 
but Hib continued to cause a modest portion of pediatric men-
ingitis cases in all WHO regions even though the number of 
serotyped Hi samples was small. The lack of detection of me-
ningococcal serogroup A in the African Region may reflect the 
varying detection of the disease across time. On another hand, 
it may show the impact of the MACV rollout in the routine im-
munization programs among the meningitis belt countries of 
sub-Saharan Africa that started from 2016 [3].
Bacterial meningitis diagnostics are often challenging, espe-
cially in laboratories in limited-resource settings, as the classical 
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Figure 3. A, Serotype distribution of specimens that tested positive for Streptococcus pneumoniae (Sp) in the World Health Organization (WHO) Global Invasive Bacterial 
Vaccine-Preventable Disease (IB-VPD) Surveillance Network by WHO region, 2014–2019 (N = 873 specimens serotyped). N in brackets indicate the number of specimens that 
were serotyped for Sp in each WHO region. The number of countries with specimens serotyped is indicated below each WHO region. Countries include those that had and 
had not introduced PCV. Serotypes indicated in colors are those that are included in 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV13). B, Serotype distribution of specimens 
that tested positive for Sp in the WHO IB-VPD Surveillance Network by country PCV introduction status, 2014–2019 (N = 873 specimens serotyped). Pre–vaccine introduction 
includes years when a country had not yet introduced PCV nationally into its routine immunization program and the year of introduction, if applicable. Post–vaccine introduc-
tion includes full years when PCV was part of the country’s routine immunization program.
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components, such as sheep blood, which may not be reliably 
available year-round. The laboratory network is a key compo-
nent of GISN. It was established to strengthen bacterial menin-
gitis diagnosis globally, as 1 of the ultimate aims of the network 
is to reinforce national capacities for molecular diagnostics and 
transfer technologies from the global to regional to country 
level. As part of the objectives of GISN, WHO has taken the 
following initiatives to improve laboratory confirmation of in-
vasive bacterial diseases caused by Sp, Hi, and Nm: supporting 
the sentinel and national laboratories to submit clinical speci-
mens to RRLs to improve case detection and characterization; 
standardizing and validating laboratory procedures; linking 
laboratory and epidemiologic data for analysis; implementing 
and maintaining global quality assurance and quality control 
procedures; and conducting training resources to laboratory 
staff. The resources and expertise made available across all levels 
of laboratories have made the network unique, opening oppor-
tunities for network laboratories to seek support and feedback 
regarding surveillance methods and laboratory techniques. The 
laboratory network has a plan to continue efforts to improve 
laboratory confirmation of meningitis cases, including sup-
port for the development and implementation of sensitive and 
specific assays that are more accessible in resource-limited set-
tings, such as direct PCR [6, 16].
During the ongoing coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) 
pandemic and other public health emergencies of national or 
international concern, it is critical to have a well-functioning 
laboratory capacity to conduct surveillance, not only for vaccine-
preventable diseases but also for emerging pathogens. Although 
a public health emergency can occur due to various pathogens, 
infrastructure and expertise built for conducting routine sur-
veillance can be leveraged to rapidly characterize emerging 
outbreaks. In addition, the establishment of high-quality sur-
veillance provides robust infrastructure to document trends 
during the emergence of other pathogens. For example, in 2020, 
the RRLs of GISN in South Africa and Brazil and Public Health 
England, which serves as the WHO Collaborating Center for 
pneumococcus, were still able to document significant and sus-
tained reductions in Sp, Hi, and Nm invasive infections, due to 
the high-quality surveillance they have maintained despite the 
perturbations caused by the COVID-19 pandemic [17].
Since the start of GISN, many participating laboratories were 
able to expand their surveillance systems beyond detecting and 
characterizing invasive bacterial diseases. For example, 1 of the 
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Figure 3. Continued.
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reference laboratories in Bangladesh has successfully utilized 
their bacterial capacities to conduct typhoid surveillance in ad-
dition to invasive bacterial diseases [18]. Sentinel sites of GISN in 
Ghana, India, and Uganda also conducted pilot surveillance for 
typhoid and paratyphoid fever from 2016 to 2019. Additionally, 
RRLs, NLs, and SSLs of GISN have leveraged their bacterial cap-
acities to detect and characterize diphtheria, by culture and PCR, 
after participating in WHO laboratory workshops on invasive 
bacterial diseases and diphtheria that were held in the African, 
European, Eastern Mediterranean, South-East Asia, and Western 
Pacific regions in 2017 and 2018. Integrating diphtheria diag-
nostics into laboratories during the 2017 diphtheria outbreak in 
Bangladesh was particularly effective as part of outbreak response 
because these laboratories were already well-established as part 
of GISN. From 2020, many of the laboratories and staff of GISN 
was repurposed to test for severe acute respiratory syndrome co-
ronavirus 2 in their own countries. These examples demonstrate 
how the strengths of GISN were utilized and expanded beyond 
routine surveillance for invasive bacterial vaccine-preventable 
diseases for which the network was originally designed.
This analysis is subject to several limitations. The overall 
diagnostic yield and bacterial isolation rate was generally low 
in the network due to limited bacteriology capacity in many 
of the participating countries and widespread antibiotic use 
before initial laboratory testing. Molecular diagnostics such 
as serotyping capacity for pneumococcus was also limited 
since less than half (873/2177 [40%]) of all confirmed Sp 
cases were serotyped globally. This was often due to limited 
laboratory resources and funding available for SSLs and NLs 
to ship the specimens for further testing at RRLs. Competing 
priorities at country and regional levels led to challenges in 
building and sustaining national laboratory capacities as well 
as maintaining surveillance capacities at the sentinel hos-
pital sites. Since GISN primarily enrolled hospitalized pedi-
atric meningitis cases through sentinel site surveillance, this 
analysis may underestimate the full burden of disease at the 
country level. This can be due to not having all cases pre-
senting at the sentinel sites from lack of access to a health-
care facility or the cases presenting at different hospitals or 



































































Figure 4. Serotype distribution of specimens that tested positive for Streptococcus pneumoniae (Sp) by year, 2014–2019, restricted to countries that introduced the 10- or 
13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV) during or prior to 2019. The proportion of countries included in this analysis that had introduced PCVs during or prior to each 
year is indicated by the line (and the percentage shown near the line). For example, in 2014, 24 of 31 countries (77.4%) had introduced PCV nationally during or prior to 2014. 
Among these 31 countries that reported serotype data in 2014, 120 (49.0%) cases had a PCV serotype whereas 125 (51.0%) had a non-PCV serotype. Although 7 countries 
reported in 2014 had not yet introduced PCV nationally, they were included in this analysis because they introduced the vaccine in the subsequent years (2015–2019). The 
numbers on the bars indicate the number of specimens with a detected Sp serotype including non-PCV type and PCV type. PCV10 serotypes include the following: 1, 4, 5, 6B, 
7F, 9V, 14, 18C, 19F, and 23F; PCV13 includes the serotypes included in PCV10 plus 3, 6A, and 19A. The PCV type and non-PCV type were analyzed based on the PCV type that 
was introduced nationally by the respective countries during that particular year.
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However, among the sentinel sites that participated in GISN 
from 2014 to 2019 globally, specimens were collected and 
laboratory testing was completed for >85% of all identified 
cases. This shows that the vast majority of the cases identi-
fied in GISN had clinical specimens collected for laboratory 
testing. It is possible that some sentinel hospitals preferen-
tially submitted information for suspected meningitis cases 
with collected CSF specimens. However, regular site assess-
ments were conducted at sentinel hospitals and laboratories 
to evaluate their performance in conducting surveillance. 
Recommendations were frequently provided to implement 
corrective actions in case the sites were deviating from 
standard protocol. Having both clinical and laboratory data 
linked in a global surveillance network has been an advantage 
when understanding the prevalence of the disease as well as 
their characteristics, such as the frequency of serotypes/sero-
groups of Sp, Hi, and Nm.
During the beginning of GISN, most of the participating coun-
tries financed their surveillance networks with the support of 
Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. As these countries phased out of eli-
gibility for Gavi funding, the number of countries reporting sur-
veillance data to GISN decreased. The highest number of sentinel 
sites participating in GISN that reported data was 2016 when 126 
sites in 58 countries reported data to GISN, but this dropped to 
105 sites in 45 countries in 2019. Concurrently, the number of 
countries contributing Sp serotype results decreased over time as 
countries either discontinued meningitis surveillance or stopped 
reporting serotype results. Although the number of countries re-
porting serotype results decreased, however, this is not expected 
to bias the estimate of PCV impact—the decrease in the propor-
tion of pneumococcal infections caused by vaccine serotypes 
over time. Additional challenges included appropriate timing 
and conditions for specimen transport and sufficient availability 
of supplies and test kits. While the network includes data from a 
wide range of countries globally, the data collected by GISN are 
not necessarily representative of all invasive bacterial diseases 
globally, within regions or within countries. Since this network 
primarily focused on reporting the 3 bacterial pathogens, Sp, 
Hi, and Nm, this analysis may underreport pediatric meningitis 
cases that are caused by other bacterial pathogens such as group 
B Streptococcus, as these may had been detected yet unreported 
after testing positive by culture.
Additionally, laboratories participating in the annual EQA 
exercise faced logistical challenges and restrictions in shipping 
or delivery of infectious materials, accounting for a decline in 
the number of laboratories reporting EQA results in some years. 
Finally, the cell count, glucose, and protein level testing that was 
used to classify cases into probable bacterial meningitis was 
mostly performed at pathology or biochemistry laboratories at 
the sentinel hospital level, and these methodologies were not 
part of the EQA activities. Therefore, the quality of the data to 
classify the probable bacterial meningitis cases in GISN cannot 
be verified in some cases.
Despite the challenges in building national bacteriology ca-
pacity and regional and global surveillance networks, GISN suc-
cessfully monitored the global burden and etiology of IB-VPD 
in a widely geographically representative set of primarily LMICs. 
The network has also supported national laboratories to hone 
their molecular capacities, opening doors to detect other viral and 
bacterial diseases including emerging pathogens. Quality control 
management exercises have encouraged all levels of laboratories 
to maintain and improve their capacities. From the start of the 
network, the sharing of the surveillance data across countries and 
regions has improved the quality of surveillance data and its use—
from understanding the disease burden by monitoring trends to 
assessing vaccine impact. The WHO African Region, for example, 
has utilized this network to investigate the disease burden of inva-
sive bacterial diseases [19]. Some countries, such as The Gambia 
and Bangladesh, were successful in informing national vaccine 
policy through the usage of surveillance data from GISN [20, 21].
Maintaining case-based, active surveillance with laboratory 
confirmation for bacterial meningitis and other prioritized vac-
cine preventable diseases is a critical part of the global agenda, as 
highlighted in the Immunization Agenda 2030 and the Defeating 
Meningitis roadmap [7, 22, 23]. The results from this analysis of 
GISN have demonstrated the critical value of a globally coor-
dinated network to understand and monitor invasive bacterial 
diseases through surveillance data. Thus, the prioritization of 
ministries of health allocating funding for surveillance is vital 
in maintaining their capacities to conduct high-data-quality 
surveillance on prioritized vaccine-preventable diseases that re-
main a concern in some countries. In conclusion, the system-
atic approach taken by the WHO-coordinated Global IB-VPD 
Surveillance Network, the geographical reach, and quality man-
agement implemented at all levels of laboratories have allowed 
this network to successfully investigate the regional and global 
disease patterns of pediatric bacterial meningitis.
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